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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
The current economic situation has sparked a debate about the role of the rating 
agencies in market performance. A crucial issue in the operation of this financial 
system is the way in which private and public information is generated, distributed and 
used and how it is incorporated into asset prices. In this study we use laboratory 
experiment to investigate the role of public information on the efficiency of financial 
markets. The main focus of the paper is to analyse if the presence of imperfect and 
exogenous private and public information improve o reduces market efficiency. We 
conclude that the introduction of a public signal with high quality than private signals, 
and the release of more public information improve price efficiency. Presence of public 
signals ensures an efficient transmission of information so market converges to the 
efficient equilibrium. It is observe that public information coordinates trading activity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
Financial markets have traditionally been analyzed under different conditions trying to 
understand their behaviour and how to reach and efficient market. The efficient 
markets hypothesis has historically been one of the mainstays of academic finance 
research. The general concept of the efficient markets hypothesis is that financial 
markets are "informationally efficient"- in other words, that asset prices in financial 
markets reflect all relevant information about an asset. For these reason a crucial issue 
in the operation of financial system is the way in which private and public information is 
generated, distributed and used and how it is incorporated into asset prices. 
 
The current economic situation has sparked a debate about the role of the rating 
agencies in market performance. Before this economic recession any information 
revealed by these rating agencies has a major impact on the market, and prices 
reacted in a very short time. The debate on rating agencies is about the method used 
for qualify the value of the assets, which with the outbreak of the economic crisis it has 
been found that the information released by this companies was not correct and many 
investors made losses. Many academics and regulators wondered why many investors 
follow the recommendations of these agencies without corroborate the information. Did 
all investors who participate in the market buy private information or they only follow 
the market behaviour? What is the role of public information in these markets? 
 
Inspired by the debate on which role have played rating agencies in the current 
financial crisis, in our paper we use laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of 
realising imperfect and free public signal in a financial market with the presence of  a 
costly private signal and also imperfect about the future value of the dividend. The main 
focus of the paper is to analyse if the presence of private and public information 
improve o reduces market efficiency. Moreover we will study the effect of public signals 
in the demand of private information and how efficient are prices with the aggregation 
of information.   
 
There have been many researchers who have analyzed the effect of the presence of 
different sources of information in financial markets. Taking into account Morris (2002) 
research, he demonstrate that public information is a double edged-instrument, 
because it conveys information on the fundamentals of a financial assets, but at teh 
same time, it serves as a focal point in coordinating the traders´ activity in a market. 
Following Morris (2002) theory, in our experiment we can see the interaction between 
private and public information.  
 
Another important paper is Sunder and Plot (1992) research which studied the impact 
of the presence of an information market (as a second market) and an assed market. In 
their experiment they defined as an insider those players who completely know the 
future value of the dividend, so they have privilege information. They conclude that 
when every traders know that there are some insiders traders buy the do not know how 
many of them there are, information is not revelled in a efficient way so market prices 
no revel any information. 
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The most similar experiment literature to our study is Hey and Morone (2003) 
experiment. They made traders decided to trade with a risk asset whose dividend at 
the end of the period depends on two states of the world with the same probability of 
occurrence, given the imperfect information available in the market. With these 
experiment they conclude that the aggregation of information improves when the 
quality and also the quantity of information available in the market is higher. 
 
There are not too many experiment literature take attention to such interaction of 
information. However we can mention some other studies which can help us to 
understand other market behaviour under different conditions. In our experiment the 
information released is imperfect but there are studies like Plott (1982) where the 
information available in the market is perfect and they also want to try to find put under 
which conditions this perfect information is efficiently incorporate into prices. In their 
experiment their determinate as in insiders those agents who are completely informed 
about the true value of the dividend, and noninsiders those who are uninformed. They 
conclude that “traders are able to decipher the true state of the dividend by simply 
observing market price”.  
One important finding is that, even under the best circumstances, information 
aggregation and/or dissemination (when occurs) is not instantaneous, since the traders 
need some time to observe the market activity, form conjectures, test them and modify 
their strategies. Therefore, there is an incentive for costly information creation due to 
the noisy revelation of information in asset markets (see Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). 
In those cases there is market for information parallel to an asset market, as we will 
see in our experiment. 
 
In general, the experimental literature focuses on the problem of the market efficiency 
in aggregating private information into prices. As we have said before there are not too 
much studies where the effects of public and private information in the market is 
evaluated due to the further investigation required. Our experiment is focused in this 
debate to try to find out what is the role of public information in the efficiency of the 
market. 
 
 
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
 
In this section we will describe the characteristic of the experiments analysed. The 
market is made up of 17 subjects. The experiment consists in three treatments. At the 
beginning of each trading period, all of the subjects are endowed with 100 units of 
experimental currency (EU) and 10 units of assets. At the end of the trading period the 
asset pays a dividend that depends on two possible ‘states of the world´ which are S 
and T, each with equal probability. If the state of the world is S the dividend is equal to 
10, and if the state of the world is T, the dividend is equal to 0. The true value of the 
world in not revealed until the end of the period, but they can however, buy private 
signals or observe the public ones. 
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At any moment when the trading period has start, subjects can buy a private signal 
which has a cost of 4 EU. Additionally, only in those treatments with public information, 
subjects have access to a public signal, that has no cost to them and it is common to 
all subjects in the market. Such signal is made public before the trading period starts. 
Both of these signals do not totally reveal the true state of the world, they are partially 
informative. These signals take either the value 0 or the value 1, where each of them 
represents a probability of occurrence which the dividend could be 0 or 10. 
 
Before starting the experiment subjects are informed about these probabilities. The 
probability of getting a private signal 1 (0) is p if the true state of the world is S (T) and 
the probability of getting a private signal 1 (0) is 1 − p if the state of the world is T (S). 
In this way, if a subject purchases a signal that results to be 1 (0), he can infer that the 
asset dividend at the end of the trading period is expected to be 10 (0) with probability 
p and 0 (10) with probability 1−p. Following the same reasoning, in the second and in 
the third treatment we introduce one public and two public signals respectively, so the 
probability of getting a public signal 1 (0) is P if the state of the world is S (T) and the 
probability of getting a public signal of 1 (0) is 1 − P if the state of the world is T (S).  
This means that, if a subject observes a public signal equal to 1 (0), he/she can infer 
that the asset dividend at the end of the trading period will be 10 (0) with probability P 
and 0 (10) with probability 1 − P.  
 
The different treatments implemented and each of the probabilities of success of the 
true value of the dividend in each signal in each period is displayed in Table 1: 
 
TREATMENT p P 
1 0.6 - 
2 0.6 0.8 
3 0.6 0.66 
 
 
From table 1 we see that in the three treatments we have private signals with a fixed 
quality which is accurate by 60%. In the second treatment, a part from the private 
signals, there is a public signal available for all the subjects and it is at least better than 
the private signals because the public ones is accurate by 80%. 
In the third treatment, in addition to the private signals, the public authority release two 
public signals which are independent among them, and each of them has 66% 
accuracy. 
 
Taking into account the accuracy of each signal type we can say that the rating agency 
or the public authority are endowed with and invest more resources in collecting and 
processing information compared to a private trader. For this reason public signals are 
more accurate about the future value of the dividend. Despite this, our experimental 
design allows for a private trader to invest in several private signals that, in aggregate, 
can make private information to be more accurate that the public signal for that 
particular trader. Therefore, we assume that the production of a public signal has lower 
cost for the public institution that for the private trader.  For that, subjects must pay if 
they want to use a private service, and those companies can cover their cost with those 
incomes.  
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Another important characteristic is that private information has a cost and its 
information is only revealed to those who have bought the signal, while public 
information is freely revealed to all traders at the beginning of the period. 
 
The experiment was programmed using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher [2007]). 
When the subjects arrived to the laboratory the instructions were distributed and 
explained aloud using a Power Point presentation and questions were answered. The 
experiment consisted in three independent treatments, the fist one has eight trading 
periods (markets) and the two remaining have seven trading periods. Each period lasts 
two and a half minutes. At the beginning of each trading period the dividend was 
randomly determined by the experimenter (but not revealed to the traders) and paid out 
at the end of the period. 
 
During the trading period subjects can buy and sell as many assets as they want- as 
long as they have money. Every bid, ask, or transaction concerned only one asset. 
Agents will end up with a stock of money and assets that can be greater or less than 
that with which they started that period.  
At the end of each market period the true dividend for that period is announced and the 
appropriate dividend distributed to the asset owners. Each subject will get profit when 
the amount of money obtained at the end of the period is higher than the initial which in 
this case are 1.000 UE. On the other hand, subjects can make losses. So profit was 
computed as the difference between their initial money endowment (M = 1000) and the 
money held at the end of the trading period. Parallel to the asset market, there is an 
information market where subjects can purchase as many private signals as they 
wanted during a given trading period, as long as they had enough money. 
 
Every subject get paid in Euros at the end of the experiment, and their benefits will 
correspond to the accumulate profits of all periods and a fixed amount of 5 Euros for 
participating in the experiment. The exchange rate is 1 Euro for every 50 points 
accumulated. 
 
 
 
3. HOW WE EXPECT THE MARKET WORKS?: 
 
There have been many experiments on financial market to analyze the presence of 
public and private information in a market, and to observe its effect on price and 
demand information from players. Each of these experiments has different 
characteristics, different information cost or other signals quality. Although in each of 
them has obtained different conclusion but there are some theories that can explain 
some market behaviours, which are equal for all the financial markets. 
 
All players will try to sell their assets at a high price and buy a low price. Is they are 
sure or they believe that the dividend will be 10, they will decide to accumulate shares, 
but nevertheless if the believe that the dividend will be 0 they will decide to sell their 
assets.  We must remember that in a perfect market an oversupply of a product 
decreases the price, and an excess demand has the opposite effect on the price. 
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Taking in to account John D. Hey and Andrea Morone considerations we can describe 
the following theory emphasizing two things; the price converge, and the two possible 
strategies for traders in a financial market. With this theory we can describe which will 
be the market behaviour according to the information available. 
 
First that the price in the market ‘should’ converge to the true value of the dividend – if 
the market correctly aggregates the information available to the agents. If the true state 
of the world is that the dividend is 10 the price ‘should’ converge to 10; if the true state 
of the world is that the dividend is zero the price ‘should’ converge to zero. However, 
we have no theory which tells us that the price will converge to the true value of the 
dividend.  
After this experiment they have no evidence on which will be the optimal behaviour of 
agents in this experiment. Obviously, a subject who pays for a signal will be greater 
informed about the true dividend and it seems to have advantages. Despite this, the 
private signal is costly and many subjects will decide not to buy private information.  In 
this case an alternative strategy is to follow the theorem of Grossman and Stiglitz, and 
to use the price of trades as an indicator of information obtained by others. 
Therefore each subject has two possible strategies: buy signals before others to be 
more informed and lead the market; do not buy signals but follow the behaviour of 
other subjects and the market prices. Thereby if the market correctly aggregates the 
information privately available, price tend to converge to the true dividend. This, in a 
sense the idea defended by Grossman and Stiglitz. 
This second strategy to follow the behaviour of other subjects has been described as 
herd behaviour in non-market context. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), 
among others, introduced this herd behaviour in the finance literature and highlighted 
its possible consequences for the overall functioning of financial markets and 
information processing by individuals. Both of them showed that this herd behaviour 
may result from private information not publicly shared. Therefore they observed that 
the market price converge to the wrong dividend when the herd behaviour appears. 
 
The phenomenon of herding was first studied in psychology. For instance, Asch (1952) 
studied the impact of an individual’s social environment on his decision behaviour and 
observed that “within individuals groups often abandon their own private signal to rely 
predominantly on group opinion. Moreover, this form of behaviour increases with the 
unpredictability of earning”. Since analysts tend to herd their pessimistic forecasts, we 
assume that they will only deviate from their unbiased estimate if their private signal is 
lower than the public signal. 
 
Asch (1952) continued explaining this theory saying that “Information-based herding 
occurs when analysts lack confidence about their private information and there exists 
(a lot of) uncertainty about the quality of public information. As a consequence, 
analysts abandon their private signal (which is needed to optimally update the available 
information), and follow the herd that maintains an inefficient consensus”. 
 
In general, evidence of herding was documented, but difficulties in measuring herding 
made it difficult to give a decisive answer about the degree of herding. 
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4. EFFICIENT MARKET BENCHMARK: 
 
Using the Bayesian inference, we can compute the probability of getting the different 
possible dividends. We can compute the probability which corresponds to the case of 
the dividend equal to 10 conditioned on number of signals purchased by all traders at 
any instant of time in the treatment, which we denote as IT = {i1, i2, ...it, ..., iT }. We 
refer to IT as the market information set. When the variable takes the value −1, it 
suggests that the dividend is equal to 0, and when takes value 1, it suggests that the 
dividend is equal to10. 
We are going to use the same Bayesian inference formula as S. Alfarano, E. Camacho 
and A. Morone (2011) use in their research about the role of public and private 
information in a laboratory financial market. 
 
 
 
Bayesian Inference with private information: 
 
We are going to use the following formula of the Bayesian inference: 
 
             
                      
      
  (1) 
 
D = 10 refers to the case of the dividend equal to 10. Pr(D = 10|IT ) probability that the 
dividend is equal to 10 conditioned to the information available in the market at time T. 
Pr(D = 10) is the prior probability of the event D = 10 without information. Pr(IT ) is the 
marginal probability: 
 
Pr (IT) = Pr(IT |D = 10) · Pr(D = 10) + Pr(IT |D = 0) · Pr(D = 0).  (2) 
 
We can compute the probability that the dividend is equal to 10 using the following 
relation: 
    Pr(D = 0|IT) = 1 − Pr(D = 10|IT )  (3)  
 
because we only have two possible dividends. 
 
The values to the different terms of these equations as a function of: 
 
 p is the probability that a single private signal is correct; 
 q = 1− p is the probability that a single private signal is incorrect; 
 NT is the number of signals in the information set available up to time T; 
 nT is the number of 1s and NT − nT is the number of -1s in the information set. 
 Since we compute the probability Pr(D = 10|IT ), the signals -1s and 1s refer to 
the true state of the world D = 10. In other words, the case it = 1 suggests that 
the dividend is 10, on the contrary, the case it = −1 suggests an asset worths 
zero. 
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In the following, when not necessary, we will omit the time variable T from the variables 
nT and NT. The first term of equation (1) is given by: 
 
                         (4) 
 
 
Given that we only have two states of the world and they can occur with the same 
portability, the prior probability is given by: 
 
     Pr(D = 10) = Pr(D = 0) = 
 
 
   (5) 
 
The marginal probability in equation (2) takes then forms: 
 
       
 
 
        
 
 
         (6) 
 
 
 
Putting together equations. (1), (4), (5) and (6), we obtain: 
 
             
         
                   
   (7) 
 
as the aggregate net private signal available at time T, the previous equation takes the 
form: 
                 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  (8) 
and 
                              
 
 
 
  
 
  
 (9) 
 
According to equation (8), we can identify several interesting cases: 
 
 If p = 1 and therefore q = 0, Pr(D = 10|IT ) = 1, which is independent of NT, 
when not zero. It is the case of fully informative signals.   
 If q = p = 0.5 then Pr(D = 10|IT) = 0.5. Purchasing signals does not provide any 
new information compared to the starting condition of equiprobability of the two 
states of the world. 
 If ηT = 0, i.e. an equal number of 1s and -1s, Pr(D = 10|IT) = 0.5. This is 
obviously the case at the beginning of the trading period when there are no 
signals in the market, and also might arise by chance during the experiment. 
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Bayesian inference with private and public information: 
 
The previous Bayesian inference equations are based on the condition of constant 
quality of signals. In our experiment private signals have a fixed quality of p=0,60 in all 
treatments.  
In two of our treatment we have a public signal of quality P ≥ p. In order to account for 
the impact of the public signal in the Bayesian inference, let us define as P the 
probability that the public signal is correct and Q = 1− P, the probability that the public 
signal is incorrect. The variable S will take the value 1 if the public signal suggests a 
dividend equal to 10 or −1 if it suggests a dividend equal to 0. Equation (4) is then 
modified as follows: 
 
                                (10) 
and 
   
                                 (11) 
 
Using equation (10) and (11), we can easily modify eq. (8) in order to take into account 
the public signal: 
                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
         (12) 
 
 
 
Efficient market price 
 
For compute the price efficiency we will continue using the Bayesian price determinate 
by S. Alfarano, E. Camacho and A. Morone (2011). In their research they defined as an 
efficient market when “all available and relevant information is incorporated into the 
price of the asset at each instant of time”. In our experimental, those means that the 
information set used by traders includes all information purchased by the traders, IT 
 
The equilibrium price is given by: 
 
                                       
 
 
 
  
 
  
         (13) 
In the presence of a public signal S equation (13) can be re-written as: 
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
(14) 
 
Equation. (13) and (14) represent a situation where, when a subject buys a signal, this 
information is incorporated into the price correctly and instantaneously as if such 
information would be available to all subjects in the market. 
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5. RESULTS: 
 
Probably the easiest way to summarize the results of our experiments is to display the 
trading activity in all the markets for the 3 treatments analyzed. As we can see in the 
Appendix 1, each of the graphs represents a period of each of the three treatments.  
All graphics in the vertical axis shows the price at which the transaction occurred, and 
the horizontal axis shows the number of shares that have taken place in an orderly 
manner. The bold solid line (either 10 or 0) above each market period shows the actual 
true dividend (revealed to the participants at the end of the trading period). 
 
To analyze the dynamics of each of these three markets we will focus on these aspects 
of the experiment; the information demand, the price efficiency, the distribution of net 
profits, and the relation between net profit and net private signals 
 
 
 INFORMATION MARKET DEMAND: 
 
One of the most important aspects of our experiment is the quality and the amount of 
information available that varies in each of the markets. Each of the subjects will not 
know the value of the dividend until the end of the period so we want to analyze under 
which conditions the available information is enough to discover the true value of the 
dividend. In particular we will focus on analyze the variation in demand from private 
signals in each market and how this demand is affected by the presence of public 
information.  
Unlike other publication carried on about the role of public and private information in 
financial markets, in our experiment the quality of the private signal is the same in all 
the three markets. 
 
Demand of private signals 
 
As we have said before, the quality of the private signals remains constant through the 
three treatments, with an efficient level of 60%. The graph below shows the distribution 
of private signals purchased in each treatment and the effect of the present of public 
information in their demand. It is apparent from the figure that the ambiguity that occurs 
in the first treatment on the future value of the dividend makes the demand of private 
signals be located at the highest point. In general, subjects are averse to such 
situations with ambiguity as shown in "The Ellsberg Paradox," in which he states that 
subjects prefer quantifiable risks to those who are unknown. Ellsberg in his experiment 
explained that the uncertainty of knowing the future outcome can be presented in two 
ways: through risk situations and situations with ambiguity.  Risk situations have a 
certain probability of a certain outcome, while ambiguous situations have a greater 
degree of uncertainty. 
 
There have been many researchers who have analyzed the presence of ambiguity and 
risk in financial markets. In one of these analyzes on the financial market Leippold 
concluded that traders react asymmetrically to the ambiguous information. 
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When ambiguous information is provided but with potential or positive consequences, 
subjects act as if they were not entirely sure of the accuracy of the information. 
However when presented with an ambiguous negative information but act as if it were 
accurate. 
 
 
 
 
In this first treatment just over 56%of the subjects decides to buy private information. In 
this way this subjects have more information and it is more accurate. Considering that, 
why other subjects do not purchase private signals to be more informed? We can 
define this as an asymmetry distribution of information. Plot and Sunder (1982) defined 
as an “insiders”, those investors with privilege information about the potential value of 
the dividend (we have to remember that in their experiment the information released is 
perfect). They studied the transmission of information in markets with the presence of 
insiders and noninsiders. Their study reveals that efficient markets may disseminate 
information from the perfectly informed investors to those uninformed. This information 
is transmitted through price and the volume of demand or supply of assets. This 
transmission of information reduces the uncertainty mentioned before. Therefore Plot 
and Sunder concluded that the market is able to extract information from insiders and 
transmit this information to the market to give advantage to all subjects. A competitive 
markets lead to an efficient location using price as a factor in information. 
 
We have to considerer that obtaining private information is costly so many players 
decided not to buy this information and follow market signals. 
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Presence of Public Information 
 
Another interesting point of the analysis relates to the impact that the presence of a 
free public signal has on the traders’ behavior in the information market, and how the 
acquisition of private signals is affected by the presence of a free public signal of better 
or similar quality that a private signal. 
 
As it is show in the graph above, when we introduce a public signal the number of 
purchased signals is significantly minor. However, when the quality of the public signal 
is higher to the single private signal (Treatment 2) the reduction on the number of 
signals purchased is more pronounced that in the situation where the public signal 
released in the market has similar accuracy that a single private signal (Treatment 3). 
Then, we can analyze this behavior in more detail. 
 
As we have said, in the second treatment when we introduce a public signal, that is 
more efficient than the private ones, demand of private information decrease. This 
situation arises for two reasons: the private information cost and his lower quality.  
These private signals have lower quality so the ambiguity of the future values of the 
dividend is higher, for these reason subjects will decide not to invest in private signals.  
According to the figure, subjects trust more on the public signals and prefer to spend 
less on private information with lower quality. Therefore it is demonstrate that there is a 
substitution of part of market information provided by several private signals with a 
single public signal. 
 
In the third treatment there are two public signals, both with higher quality than the 
private ones. However this public signals are less efficient than in the previous 
treatment, and their quality is not very high with respect to private ones. 
Analyzing the graph we can see that the demand for private information is higher than 
in the second treatment, but not as higher as the first one. 
 It seems to be that providing more public information creates more ambiguity to 
subjects, because each public signal can give different values. We must consider that if 
every public signal indicates a different value of the dividend (for example, signal A 
indicates a dividend of 10 and signal B indicates a dividend of 0), in this case traders 
do not have additional information. They will be in the same situation as in the first 
treatment, which the probability of each dividend is 50%, so they will purchase private 
signals according to this situation. For these reason in this third treatment there is an 
increase in the number of private signals, because with no further information (when 
each public signals take different values) traders try to be more informed buying private 
information.  
 
We concluded that fixing the quality of the private signal, we observe that the greater 
demand for private information takes places when in the market is not further 
information and subjects want to reduce the ambiguity of not knowing the true value of 
the dividend (Treatment 1).  Furthermore the release of public information into a 
financial market provokes a decrease on the demand of private information. This 
phenomenon is observed in both, in Treatment 2 with one public signal and in the 
Treatment 3 with two public signals. The higher quality and the free disposition of the 
public signals make subjects be more confidence in them.  
15 
 
However when we have more public information but it haves less quality, and public 
signals can give contrary information of the dividend, subjects purchase again private 
signals due to the ambiguity created of the future dividend value. 
 
However, it remains an open question; any type of public information realest to the 
market provokes a clear decrease in private signals demand? We must clarify that the 
demand of private signals not only depends on the release of public information, but it 
also depends on the quality of such information at its quantity. The more accurate is 
the public information the lower will be the demand of private signals. Despite this, an 
excess of public information available on the market creates a greater ambiguity, 
because every public signals can take different values, so subjects decide to prevent 
this situation by buying private signals. 
 
 
Two public signals with different values: 
 
In the third treatment traders have aces to more free and public information because 
they have two independent signals, but their efficiency is similar to the private signals 
(p =0, 60 and P= 0, 66). We can think that if traders have more public signals they 
would not have incentive to buy private information, but how traders react when they 
have two public signals with different values or when both indicate the same value of 
the dividend? 
Imagine that signal A indicates a dividend of 10 and signal B indicates a dividend of 0, 
in this case traders do not have additional information about what will be the dividend, 
and they are in a situation with ambiguity. They will be in the same case as in the first 
treatment, where the probability of each dividend is 50%, so they will purchase private 
signals to try to find out what will be the dividend.  
We can analyze the demand of private information when each signal take different 
values and compare this with the demand of private information in the first treatment 
because the ambiguity situation is the same. 
 
In the following table appears the number of private signals purchased in each period 
of the three treatments and the average of signals displayed by treatment. In this third 
treatment two of the seven periods (Period 4 and Period 5) show this situation where 
every public signal takes a different value (those which are marked in green). In these 
two periods, signal A show a dividend equal to 0 and the signal B show a dividend 
equal to 10. In these both periods the demand for private signals exceeds the average 
of signals purchased in the third treatment ( in Period 4 the number of signals 
purchased is 59 which is higher than the average signals of the period, 59> 42, 28. In 
Treatment 5 the number of signals purchased is 57 which is also higher than the 
average signals of the period 57 > 42, 28). Therefore we can say that in the situations 
where public signals give opposite values the demand of private information get the 
highest values. We can compare the average of signals purchased in these two 
periods with the average demand of private signals in Treatment 1. In Treatment 1 the 
average of private purchased is 49, 25 and the average of signals purchased in these 
two periods of Treatment 3 is 58 as we can see in the table. 
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 Therefore we can say that when public signals are contrary traders increase their 
demand for private signals more than usual. In this situation the knowledge on the 
value of the dividend are the same as in Treatment 1(probability of each dividend is 
50%), but having two public signals which do not added information creates a greater 
uncertainty for traders. It is a risk that can not be quantified so in these cases traders 
decided to buy more signals than usual to be more informed. 
 
 Public information is the same for everyone so everyone in these cases has the same 
ambiguity. Trader knowing that will buy more signals to be more informed than the 
other traders about the value of the dividend and to be able to adjust their purchase´s 
and sale´s prices. In this third treatment, the secondary market where traders buy 
information has the most important role. Depend on how fast traders buy signals and 
what are the values obtained they will be able to react faster in the market and get 
higher profits. However we have to remember that private information is not perfect so 
maybe the final dividend it is not what the signal indicate. For these reason traders a 
part for observing their private signals also take in to account  what the other players 
do because maybe they can think that the imperfect information that they have buy is 
incorrect and the information that other player is more accurate. So in these two 
periods that we have analyzed, how the market and prices displayed around all the 
period will have a very important role to try to find out what will be the dividend. 
Moreover if the information is efficiently distributed through the market traders who did 
not buy information can use the price of trades as an indicator of information obtained 
by others. 
 
 
PERIOD TREATMENT 1 TREATMENT 2 TREATMENT 3 Average of signals 
1 46 33 29 
36 2 38 52 33 
3 58 29 31 
4 53 21 59 
58 
5 41 34 57 
6 55 28 30  
7 54 19 57 
8 49    
Average of 
signals 
 
49,25 30,85714286 42,28571429 
 
Number of private signals purchased in each period of the three treatments and the 
average of signals displayed by treatment.  
 
Two public signals with equal values: 
 
In the other hand, how is affected the demand of private information when the two 
public signals indicate the same value of the dividend?. In this third Treatment five of 
the seven periods, signal A and B indicate the same value of the dividend (those which 
are market in orange). We have to remember that these signals are efficient in a 66%, 
so when both show the same dividend is like having one public signal with an efficiency 
of 80%.  
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For this reason we can compare the demand of private signals in those treatments with 
the demand of private signals in the second period when we only have one public 
signal with an 80% of efficiency.  
 
Firstly we can say that the demand of signals in these seven periods does not exceed 
the average signal of all treatment. Whit this data we can already see that when the 
two public signals indicate the same value, the demand for private information is not as 
high as in the previous situation. Traders therefore have public information that reveals 
the potential value of the dividend so the uncertainty is less.  
As we have said before this situation is equal to Treatment 2, because if the two 
signals show the same value is like having one only signal. For this reason we can 
compare the average of demand of private information in these seven periods of the 
third treatment (which is 36) with the average private signals in Treatment 2 (which is 
30, 85). The average of private signals in these seven periods is higher than the 
average of signals of all Treatment 2. If the two public signals show the same value of 
the dividend why traders continue buying private information? In this third treatment the 
efficiency of the public signal is minor (P= 0, 66) and similar to the efficiency of private 
signals (p= 0, 66) for that maybe some traders do not end up relying on the public 
information provided. They also can think that having two equal public signals is like 
having two private signals because their efficiency is similar, so they will continue 
buying signals to try to be more informed. 
 
 
In these traders’ behavior we can apply the Leippold theory that we mentioned before 
which say traders react asymmetrically to the ambiguous information. When there is 
some positive information or conditions in the market (like having two public signals 
whit the same value) subjects act as if they were not entirely sure of the accuracy of 
the information. They do not trust in these positive results and therefore they continue 
buying signals. However when there is a negative information (like having two public 
signals with different value) they act as if it were accurate. We have seen this behavior 
in Period 4 and 5 of Treatment 3 where traders buy a largest number of signals 
because there is a higher risk of make losses.  
 
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE PRICE EFFICIENCY 
 
In this section, we analyze if the market price converge to the Bayesian benchmark in a 
market with costly private information and also to the introduction of public information. 
In other words, given the information available in the market, we want to compare what 
the subjects have done in the experiment and what they could have done to get an 
efficient market.  
 
To analyze this price efficiency we had calculate the Bayesian benchmark for each 
trading period of the three markets, and we have compared it with the average price of 
each trading period. As we have said before and taking into account John D. Hey and 
Andrea Morone (2004) theory, the price market ‘should’ converge to the true value of 
the dividend to become a efficient market. So we can see this efficiency represented in 
the Bayesian benchmark.  
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This Bayesian benchmark represents the optimal price that market should achieve 
given the information available in the market. When the dividend is 10 the Bayesian 
benchmark should converge to 10; and when the dividend is zero the Bayesian 
benchmark should converge to zero.  
 
We can see the results of this comparison in the following graphs. Each of the graphs 
represents a treatment. The vertical axis shows the price, and the horizontal axis 
shows each treading period of the treatments. The blue line represents the average 
price of every period, and the green line represents the Bayesian benchmark of each 
period according to the information available in the market. The sort red lines indicate if 
the dividend of the every period was 0 or 10, and thus allow us to know if the price is 
adjusted to the future dividend. In the graph also appears the net private signal of each 
period. 
 
Treatment 1 
 
Observing the first graph which is referred to the first treatment we can see that, 
independently of which has been the dividend, the average price throughout the whole 
treatment do not have too much volatility. Why subjects react in this way?  Some of the 
subjects did not buy signals, so they are guided by market signals. Without knowing 
what could be the future dividend they are not willing to earn less than 4 o 5 UE per 
share which that could be interpreted as the average profit knowing that the dividend 
can only be 0 or 10.   
The other subjects who buy signals observed the values advised but they also take in 
to account how rest of the traders act. Those traders are more informed than the rest, 
and they more or less know if market is acting according to the future dividend.  
 
In this type of financial markets the dissemination of information is not always perfect 
and immediate, and sometime market does not transfer the information of informed 
traders (those who buy signals) to those uninformed. In this third treatment this 
situation is described because the price does not converge to any dividend value, so 
traders did not use the information purchased in a good way. However those informed 
traders can use their knowledge of the value of the dividend and give incorrect 
information to the market, and for these reason the prices do not converge to the true 
dividend. Maybe along periods traders who did not buy information and observed the 
market behavior to try to find out the dividend will realize that informed traders use their 
privileged position to deceiving them about the true value of the dividend. We can 
identify this as a learning process where subjects begin to understand market signals 
and to detect false information or behavior. This is a slow process and subjects may 
not identify these situations after a few periods. On the other hand each trader do not 
know how many informed traders are in the market, and although they have purchased 
private signals tend to follow the market behavior ( observing prices) before 
considering the values of their signals. This could explain traders’ behavior in this 
treatment. 
 
As we can see on the graph the Bayesian benchmark always converges to the future 
value of the dividend given market information. However there is one period (Period 3) 
in which this efficiency is not met.  
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We can observe this behaviour in a more detailed form. To calculate the Bayesian 
benchmark we take into account the number of private signals presents in each 
treatment. We calculate how many signals indicate that the dividend will be 0 and how 
many indicates that the dividend will be 10. Focusing the third period, we have a 
negative net private signal equal to -2. This situation indicates that in this period there 
are more incorrect than correct signal i.e. the final dividend was 10 but there are 30 
private signals which show that the dividend will be 0 and 28 signals which show that 
the dividend will be 10. According to this information the Bayesian benchmark takes a 
value of 3, 1 which is far from the dividend due to the higher number of incorrect 
information. 
 
As we have mentioned before Bayesian benchmark depends on the number of net 
private signals. If the net private signals is negative means that there is more incorrect 
information and the Bayesian will not converge to the true value of the dividend as in 
this case. Additionally the more number of positive net private signals are in a period 
the more adjusted will be the Bayesian benchmark to the dividend as we can show in 
the graph. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Knowing what is the efficient price given the information released in the market; we 
have to compare it with the average price that players have achieved in each 
treatment. We can observe this phenomenon by comparing the evolution of the blue 
line to the green line. As we have said before the blue line does not have too much 
volatility and it does not follow the value of the dividend. In this treatment we can see 
that there is a great divergence between what should have happened in the market and 
the balance achieved by traders.  
 
In conclusion we have to say that with the information available in the market traders 
have enough information to know what will be the true dividend, as we have seen in the 
Bayesian benchmark. Moreover this information was not efficiently distributed among 
the market and traders.  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
Average 2,7 5,2 4,9 5,6 5,2 4,4 4,3 5,6 
Bayesian Benchmark 0,0 9,6 3,1 9,4 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,6 
Dividend 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 
Net Private Signals 20 8 -2 7 11 13 8 7 
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TREATMENT 1 
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Those who buy information use their privilege situation to show incorrect information to 
the market about the dividend. The rest of traders need learning process to understand 
market behaviour and to be able to interpret false information. However traders who 
buy signals do not use this information to get an efficient equilibrium and they prefer to 
set prices for buying and selling over half of the possible value of the dividend.  They 
are only willing to win or lose half the value of the dividend, independently of which is 
the future value of the dividend. 
 
Treatment 2 
 
This second graph is referred to the second treatment where traders have public and 
private information. With the information available in the market the Bayesian 
benchmark efficiently converge to the future value of the dividend in the first four 
treatments. However in the last three treatments this converges is not met.  If we take 
into account the net private signals in the first four periods their values are positive so 
there is more correct than incorrect signals purchased, so the Bayesian benchmark has 
enough good information to converge to the true value. In the other three treatments 
the net private signals is negative so the Bayesian benchmark does not reach to 
converge to the true dividend.  
Taking in to account this data, traders have enough good information to get a efficient 
equilibrium in the first four treatments, but in the last three treatments they do not have 
enough correct information to get an efficient equilibrium due to the among of incorrect 
signals. 
 
Comparing the average price with the Bayesian benchmark, in the first four periods we 
can say that the price converge roughly towards and efficient equilibrium given the 
information available, because the average price is between 1, 8 UE and 2, 6 UE and 
the dividend in this periods is 0. In the other three periods the average price is higher 
and it does not converge to the Bayesian benchmark. We can also explain this trader’s 
behavior observing the net private signals. As we have said in all these three 
treatments the net private signals are negative, so the information available in the 
market does not reflect the true value of the dividend. Traders were not properly 
informed because there are more incorrect than correct signals so they bull and sell 
assets believing that the dividend will take the opposite value. For these reason the 
average price tends to converge to the wrong way according to the true value of the 
dividend. 
 
Despite this the average price follows the Bayesian benchmark. Therefore given the 
information available in the market the average price in each period is almost adjusted 
to the efficient equilibrium determinate by the Bayesian benchmark. We can say than in 
this treatment, traders use the information available in a efficient way and it reveled in 
the market. The learning process about we have talk before has had a positive effect in 
this treatment because traders, after the first treatment have learn how to understand 
market behavior and they have apply this knowledge in this treatment. 
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Figure 3 
 
Treatment 3: 
 
This third graph is referred to the third treatment where traders have two public signals 
and costly private information. What attracts the attention of this graph is the volatility of 
the average price among the treatment. As we can observed in the graph, and a 
feature we have seen in the rest of the treatments, is that the Bayesian benchmark 
converges to the true dividend when the net private signals takes a positive value and it 
moves away from the dividend when the net private signals has a negative value. In 
period 5 and 6 there are more incorrect information than correct so the Bayesian 
benchmark cannot converge to the true dividend. 
 
With the information available in the market traders get an average price near to the 
efficient price determinate by the Bayesian benchmark. So traders have use the 
information displayed in a good way and it led them to approach their prices to the 
equilibrium.  
 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
Average 2,6 2,1 1,8 1,7 6,0 8,2 4,0 
Bayesian Benchmark 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,2 4,4 3,6 2,7 
Dividend 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Net Private Signals 5 10 9 7 -4 -2 -1 
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TREATMENT 2 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
Average 7,3 8,7 2,4 3,1 5,0 3,0 5,5 
Bayesian Benchmark 9,7 10,0 0,7 0,0 4,0 3,7 9,9 
Dividend 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 
Net Private Signals 5 9 3 17 -1 -2 21 
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 PRICE DESVIATION REGARDING BAYESIAN PRICE 
 
Apart from observing what should be the efficient price according to the information 
available, we can quantify the deviation from what the traders could have achieved 
using efficiently all available information and what they really do in their trading activity. 
We can calculate the deviation between the market price and the Bayesian benchmark. 
As a measure of market efficiency we use: 
     
 
   
 
         
  
   
   
 
where Bt is the Bayesian price, PRt is the average market price and t denotes the 
seconds in a trading period.  
We can calculate this deviation for each treatment and observed if the traders have 
been able to use the information available to find out the correct dividend and get a 
price equilibrium which we have determinate by the Bayesian benchmark. The table 
below shows the results of the deviation between the average price and the Bayesian 
price, to see how far or close have been traders to the equilibrium. The smaller the 
number is the nearest will be the market to the equilibrium. The results in the three 
treatments are approximately 0 but the treatment with less deviation were Treatment 2 
and Treatment 3, so the prices achieved are closer to the efficient Bayesian prices. In 
these two treatments we have public signals and costly private signals so the greater 
availability of information makes traders be more efficient in incorporating information 
into prices.  
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
     0,01232 0,00995 0,009702 
 
However in Treatment 1 traders have move away from the efficient equilibrium 
because they did not use the information available in a good way and also they only try 
to win or lose at most the half potential value of the dividend without take into account 
the values of signals. In this case at the beginning of the treatment traders only know 
that the dividend could be 0 or 10 with equal probability and if they want more 
information they have to buy imperfect private signals. So in this treatment traders have 
less information than in the other two treatments with public signals. Therefore we can 
conclude that the efficiency of prices in incorporating the information increases with the 
quantity (and quality) information available to the traders in the market. 
 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF NET PROFITS IN EACH TREATMENT: 
 
The main objective of the experiment is achieving as many profits for each treatment. 
Each subject can follow different strategies but everybody wants to maximize their 
profits. After having analyzed the demand of private information with the presence of 
public information, the efficiency of prices and the deviation regarding Bayesian 
efficient price we can observe what have been the profits in all the periods.  
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One of the most interesting aspects is to analyze trader´s profits in different treatments 
and see how affects the presence of private and public information on them. The three 
following graphs show the net profit of each of the 17 traders in each of the periods of 
the three treatments. 
 
We have to remember that private information has a cost (4UE) so we can calculate 
the net profit with the following equation:  
 
Net profit = Profit – 4 x Number of signals purchased in the period 
 
 
As we have said every trader has a strategy and acts independently so each of them 
will have different profits. However as we can see in the graph is seems that all traders 
tend to follow the same distribution of profits. We can analyze profits distribution taking 
into account the information released in each treatment and the net private signals. 
In the first graph related to Treatment 1, most traders made higher profits in the first 
four treatments, besides in Treatment 3 most of them reduce their profits due to the 
negative value of the net private signals. At the end of the treatment is where traders 
get fewer profits. How we can explain this? If we observe Figure 1, in the last periods of 
this treatment the dividend is equal to 0 so at the end of these periods asset did not 
give profitability and their profits are minor. 
 
In the second treatment it seems that most of traders follow the same distribution of 
profits around all the treatment. The highest profit takes places for most traders in 
Period 5. In this period according to Figure 2 the average price reach a high level and 
also the dividend is equal to 10 so profits are higher. In Period 6 there is a decrease on 
profits because although the price in that period is the highest of the treatment the 
dividend was 0 so traders do not reach many benefits. 
 
In the third treatment most of traders get fewer profits in Period 3, Period 4 and 
Period6. What have in commune those periods? If we observe Figure 3 we can realize 
that only on those periods the dividend was equal to 0 so traders did not gaet more 
profits at the end of those periods. 
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After having analyzed the different profit distribution per each trader in each period we 
can summarize these three graphs in one graph. The shows the total net profit that 
each trader has obtained in each of the treatments. It can be clearly seen that the 
period of most traders has les total net profit is in Treatment 2. What happened in this 
treatment? If we observe Figure 2 in six of the seven periods the final dividend is equal 
to 0 so in this treatment is where traders have obtained the lower profitability to the 
assets. On the other hand, in Treatment 3 most traders obtained the higher amount of 
net profits. That is because the dividend is equal to 10 in 4 periods and as we have 
said before this treatment has the lower deviation between prices and the efficient 
equilibrium determinate by Bayesian prices, so traders have been more efficient in 
incorporating information into prices.  
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 RELATION BETWEEN NET PROFIT AND NET PRIVATE SIGNALS 
 
Throughout the whole experiment traders buy private information trying to find out what 
will be the dividend. Depending on the value taken by these signals they will decide to 
buy or sell assets, and make bid and ask at determinate prices according to the 
information they have. For these reason it is important to find out if there is any relation 
between the net private signals available for each traders and their net profits.. As we 
have described in other section net private signals is the different between the number 
of correct signals and number of incorrect signals. A higher and positive number of net 
private signals indicate that traders have more information and it is accurate (there are 
more correct signals than incorrect). 
 
We can use this following graph to so see this correlation and how it changes in each 
treatment. The vertical axis in each graph shows the net profit and in the horizontal axis 
are represented the net private signals. In the experiment participated 17 subjects so 
each of them would have a net private signals and a net profit for each of the periods 
played. In the first and third treatment the slope of the lines, which determine the 
distribution of the correlation between the two variables, is positive. It means that an 
increase in net private signals causes an increase on the net profit of each trader. 
However in the second treatment this relation is negative so a high level of net private 
signals causes a decrease in the net profit of traders. 
Furthermore, graphs if we observe R2 in the three treatments the correlation between 
these two variables, is very low in all of them, and the slow of the lines are also low. So 
we can say that the net private signals have no effect (or almost no effect) in the net 
profit of traders. 
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6. CONCLUSION: 
 
The current economic situation has create a debate about the role that rating agencies 
have plays in the financial markets and how investors have been following their 
predictions, and transfer those information to the market. In this paper we have use a 
laboratory experiment to investigate the role of public information on the efficiency of 
financial markets. We want to analyze what is the effect in the efficiency market when 
we add a public signal with higher quality (than private signals) and what occurs if we 
increase the amount of public signals released. 
 
The efficient markets hypothesis has historically been referred when all relevant and 
available information is correctly incorporate into prices. Taking in to account this 
hypothesis we want to analysis this aggregation of information in financial markets. We 
have proportionate to the traders of the experiments exogenous and imperfect 
information about the two possible values which can take the dividend at the end of the 
period. We want to investigate how traders react when they have different sources of 
information as costly private signals and free and public signals. 
 
We have show that with a fixed quality of privet signals the presence of public signals 
decreases the demand of private information due to the highest quality of the public 
information. However when traders have access to more public signals, each signal 
can take different values so this ambiguity of the future value of the dividend causes an 
increase in demand of private information. 
 
Following that we have studied how the released of a noisy public signal affects the 
efficiency of prices in aggregation information. We observed that with the introduction 
of public information the prices follow the equilibrium determinate by the Bayesian 
price. So the market based their prices specially taking into account the public 
information and not taking into consideration private signals. Furthermore when we 
analyzed the variation between the price determinate by the market and the efficient 
equilibrium, in those treatments with public signals this deviation is insignificant. So we 
can conclude that public information helps traders and market to reach an efficient 
equilibrium given the information available. Moreover with the presence of public 
signals the information available in the market is perfectly distributed among all traders 
We can refer to Morris (2002) to interpret our results. He said that “public information 
has a double-edge instrument, coordinating trading activity and conveying fundamental 
information”. 
 
The presence of correct information allows market to converge to the true value of the 
dividend; however it has been demonstrate that with present of incorrect information 
the equilibrium reached is not efficient. Furthermore we have show that there is no 
correlation between profits and the net private signal , so profit depends on the price 
reached in the market and the value of the dividend.  
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8. APPENDIX: 
 
APPENDIX 1: Trading activity in all markets. 
TREATMENT 1 
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APPENDIX 1: TREATMENT 2 
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APPENDIX 1: TREATMNET 3: 
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APPENDIX 2:  
Profit and signals purchased per each trader in each period of Treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
Total net profit per trader in each period of Treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
TREATMENT-1
Subjec
t
Profit 
P1
Signal
s P1
Profit 
P2
Signal
s P2
Profit 
P3
Signal
s P3
Profit 
P4
Signal
s P4
Profit 
P5
Signal
s P5
Profit 
P6
Signal
s P6
Profit 
7
Signal
s P7
Profit 
8
Signal
s P8
SIGNALS 
PURCHASE
D
COST 
OF 
SIGNAL
S1 4,8 0 101 0 106 0 98 0 -4,5 0 -4,5 0 0 0 -42 0 0 0
2 -114,8 24 108,6 8 42 20 5 16 -31 9 -51 15 -258 8 10 12 112 448
3 15,4 3 87,5 3 63 5 52,5 5 21 3 14 5 -20 4 47 2 30 120
4 -4,8 2 77 10 72 8 98 4 -35 6 24 3 -5 8 39 4 45 180
5 10,0 0 50 0 63 0 50 2 39 2 -88,5 6 27 4 -36 9 23 0
6 6,5 0 84,1 0 102 0 89 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 2 -1,5 1 3 0
7 -6,0 0 133 4 24 4 221 5 50,5 6 16 9 24 4 44 4 36 0
8 3,0 0 78 0 92 0 70,5 0 -14,5 0 -140 0 -56,5 0 17 2 2 0
9 -9,0 8 29,9 4 14 8 71 7 30 3 34 5 1 10 -62 3 48 192
10 4,0 1 64,5 2 116,5 2 76 3 -31 3 7 0 7 1 -19 1 13 52
11 -10,0 2 80 1 75 2 51,5 2 -8 2 5 2 24 2 32 2 15 8
12 -5,0 0 62,5 0 85 1 57,5 1 -16 0 10,5 1 28 0 25,5 1 4 0
13 25,0 2 186 2 239 3 168 3 27 3 38 3 33 2 -247,4 3 21 8
14 -12,0 2 122 2 83,5 4 124 2 -0,79 4 -87,5 5 32,5 5 47 4 28 8
15 -45,0 1 93 1 123,5 1 69 1 -26,5 0 -38 1 34 1 -26 1 7 4
16 -31,0 1 114 1 60,5 0 114 1 38,5 0 41 0 44 1 -23,5 0 4 4
17 -15,0 0 76,5 0 107 0 73 1 -2 0 1,5 0 35 2 0,6 0 3 0
Subject
Net 
profit 
P1
Net 
profit 
P2
Net 
profit 
P3
Net 
profit 
P4
Net 
profit 
P5
Net 
profit 
P6
Net 
profit 
P7
Net 
profit 
P8
TOTA
L NET 
PROFI
T
1 4,8 101 106 98 -4,5 -4,5 0 -90,23 210,6
2 -210,8 76,6 -38 -59 -67 -111,1 -290 -37,8 -737,1
3 3,4 75,5 43 32,5 9 -6,1 -35,9 -1,2 120,2
4 -12,8 37 40 82 -59 12 -37 -9 53,2
5 10 50 63 42 31,4 -112,5 10,8 -84 10,7
6 6,5 84,1 102 88,8 -1,3 -1 -9,1 -49,5 220,5
7 -6 117 8 201,3 26,5 -20 8 -4 330,8
8 3 78 92 70,5 -14,5 -140 -56,5 -31 1,5
9 -41 13,9 -18 43 17,9 13,7 -39 -110 -119,5
10 0 56,5 108,5 64 -43 7 2,9 -67,31 128,6
11 -18 76 67 43,5 -16 -2,9 16 -16,3 149,3
12 -5 62,5 81 53,5 -16 6,5 28,3 -22,5 188,3
13 17 178 227 156,3 15 26 25,4 -295,4 349,3
14 -20 114,4 67,5 115,6 -16,79 -107,5 12,5 -0,9 164,8
15 -49 89 119,5 65 -26,5 -42 29,8 -73,9 111,9
16 -35 110 60,5 110 38,5 40,9 39,7 -71,5 293,1
17 -15 76,5 107 69 -2 1,5 27 -47,4 216,6
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APPENDIX 2: 
 
Profit and signals purchased per each trader in each period of Treatment 2 
 
 
 
 
Total net profit per trader in each period of Treatment 2 
 
 
 
Subject
Profit 
P1
Signal
s P1
Profit 
P2
Signal
s P2
Profit 
P3
Signal
s P3
Profit 
P4
Signal
s P4
Profit 
P5
Signal
s P5
Profit 
P6
Signal
s P6
Profit 7
Signal
s P7
SIGNALS 
PURCHAS
ED
COST OF 
SIGNALS
1 0 0 0 0 -8 0 -3 0 100 0 35 0 10,5 0 0 0
2 -48,7 10 -151 24 -85 15 -66 10 26 12 -206 12 -204,9 10 93 372
3 32,7 0 17 0 19 0 19 0 104,5 0 -6,5 0 49 0 0 0
4 -43,5 5 -40,5 5 -49 3 -14 3 83 4 73 4 -5 2 26 104
5 19,5 2 -15 7 19 0 18 0 65 10 88 0 50 0 19 76
6 -1,6 0 0,9 0 1 0 0,49 0 101 0 24 0 -1,5 0 0 0
7 32 0 1 0 -60 0 -37 0 127 0 1 0 50 0 0 0
8 -29,1 2 3 0 14 0 8 0 144 0 -57 0 -183,1 0 2 8
9 14 1 17 1 20 0 19 0 113,8 1 -46 1 47,5 0 4 16
10 16 0 -10 4 2 2 9 0 102,3 0 -17,5 0 48 0 6 24
11 -3 1 -6 0 -0,9 1 3 0 58 2 33 2 20 2 8 32
12 1,5 0 -9 1 5 0 5 0 68,5 0 46 1 21,5 1 3 12
13 14 1 15,5 1 -0,39 5 15 1 77 2 -155 2 45 1 13 52
14 25,2 3 -3 4 9 2 -16 7 75 3 21 6 -83 3 28 112
15 -73,5 4 -48 4 -48 0 -64 0 90 0 90 0 -34 0 8 32
16 6 3 17 0 17 0 17 0 138 0 -59 0 47,5 0 3 12
17 6,5 1 3,5 1 -0,5 1 0,8 0 93 0 24 0 46 0 3 12
Subject
Net 
profit 
P1
Net 
profit 
P2
Net 
profit 
P3
Net 
profit 
P4
Net 
profit 
P5
Net 
profit 
P6
Net 
profit 
P7
TOTAL 
NET 
PROFI
T
1 0 0 -8 -2,6 100 35,4 10,5 135,3
2 -88,7 -247,3 -145,4 -106,2 -22,4 -253,5 -244,9 -1108
3 32,7 16,5 18,8 19,3 104,5 -6,5 49 234,3
4 -63,5 -60,5 -61,11 -25,7 66,6 56,7 -12,6 -100,1
5 11,5 -43 19,2 17,7 25 88 50 168,4
6 -1,6 0,9 1,2 0,49 100,9 24,1 -1,5 124,49
7 32 1 -59,9 -36,6 127,1 1 50 114,6
8 -37,1 3 14 8,3 144,2 -56,6 -183,1 -107,3
9 10 13 20,1 19,2 109,8 -50,2 47,5 169,4
10 16 -26 -6 8,7 102,3 -17,5 48 125,5
11 -7 -6,1 -4,9 3 50,4 24,8 11,7 71,9
12 1,5 -13 4,7 5,1 68,5 41,8 17,5 126,1
13 10 11,5 -20,39 10,8 68,6 -163,2 41,2 -41,49
14 13,2 -18,91 1,2 -43,81 62,6 -3,1 -94,8 -83,62
15 -89,5 -64 -47,9 -63,6 89,7 90,2 -34 -119,1
16 -6 17,4 17,2 17,1 137,6 -59,4 47,5 171,4
17 2,5 -0,5 -4,5 0,8 92,6 24 46 160,9
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APPENDIX 2: 
 
Profit and signals purchased per each trader in each period of Treatment 3 
 
 
 
Total net profit per trader in each period of Treatment 3 
 
  
Subje
ct
Profit 
P1
Signal
s P1
Profit 
P2
Signal
s P2
Profit 
P3
Signal
s P3
Profit 
P4
Signal
s P4
Profit 
P5
Signal
s P5
Profit 
P6
Signal
s P6
Profit 7
Signal
s P7
SIGNALS 
PURCHAS
ED
COST OF 
SIGNALS
1 101,0 0,0 107,7 0,0 -3,0 0,0 -3,1 0,0 101,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 97,6 0,0 0,0 0,0
2 107,2 6,0 52,0 10,0 -124,7 16,0 -124,2 20,0 182,1 9,0 -244,9 11,0 170,5 12,0 84,0 336,0
3 100,0 0,0 101,1 0,0 17,3 0,0 33,4 1,0 69,2 0,0 31,1 0,0 48,9 0,0 1,0 4,0
4 89,9 1,0 93,7 1,0 -5,5 1,0 32,7 3,0 63,8 4,0 0,8 1,0 72,9 2,0 13,0 52,0
5 64,0 10,0 60,0 10,0 8,5 3,0 10,0 10,0 43,2 5,0 30,8 0,0 53,0 20,0 58,0 232,0
6 93,0 1,0 95,0 1,0 -12,3 1,0 1,5 2,0 103,7 0,0 -17,5 3,0 50,2 3,0 11,0 44,0
7 86,0 0,0 101,1 0,0 11,4 0,0 -252,7 3,0 239,1 7,0 -14,0 6,0 246,1 8,0 24,0 96,0
8 126,6 0,0 102,1 0,0 -18,0 0,0 -98,8 0,0 60,4 12,0 33,0 0,0 30,0 0,0 12,0 48,0
9 106,5 0,0 109,5 0,0 18,7 0,0 46,5 2,0 35,7 7,0 28,9 0,0 71,9 3,0 12,0 48,0
10 86,1 1,0 86,9 3,0 7,7 1,0 -3,0 5,0 100,0 0,0 32,1 0,0 47,7 0,0 10,0 40,0
11 73,0 2,0 89,7 1,0 5,1 1,0 23,1 2,0 80,5 2,0 4,1 2,0 37,0 3,0 13,0 52,0
12 83,4 0,0 89,3 1,0 -21,1 2,0 -11,0 1,0 91,3 1,0 1,5 1,0 76,4 0,0 6,0 24,0
13 74,5 3,0 98,7 1,0 17,9 1,0 38,9 4,0 61,6 2,0 31,1 1,0 224,2 3,0 15,0 60,0
14 98,1 3,0 94,8 3,0 5,0 4,0 36,4 3,0 48,7 5,0 23,4 3,0 22,9 3,0 24,0 96,0
15 101,7 1,0 94,8 1,0 -22,6 0,0 -28,9 0,0 80,5 0,0 -22,2 0,0 128,9 0,0 2,0 8,0
16 109,3 0,0 101,6 0,0 22,6 0,0 1,2 2,0 46,2 2,0 -19,2 1,0 39,3 0,0 5,0 20,0
17 83,7 1,0 93,4 1,0 -31,0 1,0 62,0 1,0 64,5 1,0 -19,0 1,0 54,5 0,0 6,0 24,0
Subje
ct
Net 
profit 
P1
Net 
profit 
P2
Net 
profit 
P3
Net 
profit 
P4
Net 
profit 
P5
Net 
profit 
P6
Net 
profit 
P7
TOTAL 
NET 
PROFI
T
1 101 107,7 -3 -3,1 101,5 0 97,6 401,7
2 83,2 12 -188,7 -204,2 146,1 -288,9 122,5 -318
3 100 101,1 17,3 29,4 69,2 31,1 48,9 397
4 85,9 89,7 -9,5 20,7 47,8 -3,21 64,9 296,29
5 24 20 -3,5 -30 23,2 30,8 -27 37,5
6 89 91 -16,3 -6,5 103,7 -29,51 38,2 269,59
7 86 101,1 11,4 -264,7 211,1 -38 214,1 321
8 126,6 102,1 -18 -98,8 12,4 33 30 187,3
9 106,5 109,5 18,7 38,5 7,7 28,9 59,9 369,7
10 82,1 74,9 3,7 -23 100 32,1 47,7 317,5
11 65 85,7 1,1 15,1 72,5 -3,9 25 260,5
12 83,4 85,3 -29,1 -15 87,3 -2,5 76,4 285,8
13 62,5 94,7 13,9 22,9 53,6 27,1 212,2 486,9
14 86,1 82,8 -11 24,4 28,7 11,4 10,9 233,3
15 97,7 90,8 -22,6 -28,9 80,5 -22,2 128,9 324,2
16 109,3 101,6 22,6 -6,8 38,2 -23,2 39,3 281
17 79,7 89,4 -35 58 60,5 -23 54,5 284,1
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APPENDIX 3 
TOTAL NET PROFIT PER TRADER IN EACH TREATMENT: 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4: 
Net private signals of each trader in each period of Treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
Subjec
t
TREATMENT 
1
TREATMENT 
2
TREATMENT 
3
1 258,8 135,3 401,7
2 -737,1 -1108,4 -318
3 168,2 234,3 397
4 85,2 -100,11 296,29
5 22,7 168,4 37,5
6 263,5 124,49 269,59
7 362,8 114,6 321
8 -14,5 -107,3 187,3
9 -83,5 169,4 369,7
10 176,59 125,5 317,5
11 193,3 71,9 260,5
12 150,8 126,1 285,8
13 385,3 -41,49 486,9
14 196,71 -83,62 233,3
15 172 -119,1 324,2
16 349,5 171,4 281
17 268,6 160,9 284,1
Subject
Net private 
signals 1
Net 
private 
signals 2
Net 
private 
signals 3
Net 
private 
signals 4
Net 
private 
signals 5
Net 
private 
signals 6
Net 
private 
signals 7
Net 
private 
signals 8
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 12 0 -2 -2 5 3 -4 4
3 1 1 1 -1 3 1 -2 2
4 2 2 2 2 0 3 0 4
5 0 0 0 -2 0 -2 0 -1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -1
7 0 2 -2 5 0 3 4 2
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
9 2 -2 -2 3 3 3 2 -3
10 1 0 2 -3 -1 0 -1 -1
11 0 1 -2 -2 -2 0 2 0
12 0 0 1 1 0 -1 0 -1
13 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 -1
14 2 2 -2 2 2 1 1 2
15 -1 -1 1 1 0 1 -1 -1
16 -1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
17 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
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APPENDIX 4: 
Net private signals of each trader in each period of Treatment 2 
 
 
 
Net private signals of each trader in each period of Treatment 3 
 
 
 
Subject
Net private 
signals 1
Net 
private 
signals 2
Net 
private 
signals 3
Net 
private 
signals 4
Net 
private 
signals 5
Net 
private 
signals 6
Net 
private 
signals 7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 6 8 5 4 2 -2 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 -5 -5 1 1 2 2 0
5 2 -1 0 0 -2 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 0 0 1 -1 0
10 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
11 1 0 -1 0 -2 -2 0
12 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
13 1 1 1 1 -2 -2 1
14 1 2 2 1 -3 2 -3
15 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0
Subject
Net private 
signals 1
Net 
private 
signals 2
Net 
private 
signals 3
Net 
private 
signals 4
Net 
private 
signals 5
Net 
private 
signals 6
Net 
private 
signals 7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 0 2 5 -1 2
3 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
4 -1 1 1 3 0 -1 0
5 4 4 3 6 -5 0 10
6 1 -1 -1 2 0 1 -1
7 0 0 0 -3 3 2 4
8 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0
9 0 0 0 2 -1 0 3
10 -1 1 1 -1 0 0 0
11 0 1 -1 2 2 -2 1
12 0 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 0
13 -1 1 1 2 -2 1 3
14 -1 -1 0 3 -1 1 -1
15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 0
17 1 1 1 1 1 -1 0
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APPENDIX 5: Purchased signals distribution along the three treatments 
 
 
 
TREATMENT PERIOD
NUMBER OF 
TRADER WHO 
BUY SIGNALS SIGNALS NET PRIVATE SIGNALS SIGNALS EQUAL TO 1 SIGNALS EQUAL TO 0 DIVIDEND SIGNAL A SIGNAL B
1 1 10 46 20 13 33 0
1 2 10 38 8 23 15 10
1 3 10 58 -2 28 30 10
1 4 12 53 7 30 23 10
1 5 8 41 11 15 26 0
1 6 8 55 13 21 34 0
1 7 9 54 8 23 31 0
1 8 10 49 7 21 28 0
394
2 1 8 33 5 14 19 0 0
2 2 8 52 10 21 31 0 0
2 3 7 29 9 10 19 0 0
2 4 3 21 7 7 14 0 0
2 5 6 34 -4 15 19 10 1
2 6 6 28 -2 15 13 0 1
2 7 5 19 -1 10 9 0 0
216
3 1 9 29 5 17 12 10 1 1
3 2 12 33 9 21 12 10 1 1
3 3 8 31 3 14 17 0 0 0
3 4 9 59 17 21 38 0 0 1
3 5 6 57 -1 28 29 10 0 1
3 6 8 30 -2 16 14 0 0 0
3 7 3 57 21 39 18 10 0 0
296
TOTAL OF SIGNALS
TOTAL OF SIGNALS
TOTAL OF SIGNALS
